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'I'hr NcthcrlandaAbstract
In Alesina [1987~ the interaction between political parties ia modelled as a repeated game.
Alesina considers the Nash bargaining solution of the corresponding static game and shows
that it is a function of the probability that a political party wins the elections. He is not
able to derive a closed form solution for thia function and therefore uaea an approximation
to obtain his results. In this note the closed form solution is derived and the exact results
are compared wíth the results obtained by Alesina. Although most of hia conclusions are
qualitatively correct, quantitatively there may be considerable differencea.I
1 Introduction
lu the paper Alesina [1987] the interaction of two political parties with different objectives
concerning inflation and unemployment is considered. A repeated game to model thia
interaction is formulated. For the corresponding static game the efficient frontier and a
threat point for both political parties is derived. It is shown that the Nash bargaining
solution is a function of the probability that a political party wine the electiona. However,
Alesina is not ablc to derivc thc closed form solution for this [unction. The closed forrn
solut.ion is also needed to derive the value the discount factor must have in order to be able
to support the Nash bargaining solution as a subgame perfect equilibrium in the repeated
game. Alesina solves these problems by using an approximation of the closed form solution.
In this note the closed form expression for the Nash bargaining solution is derived using
elementary mathematical techniques. Moreover, a closed form expression is given for the
discount factors which sustain the Nasó bargaining solution.
In Section 2 the game-theoretic model and the most important results of Alesina [1987]
are summarized. These are the one-shot Nash solution, the efficient frontier and an expres-
sion the Nash bargaining solution has to satisfy. Moreovet, the closed forms for the Nash
bargaining solution and for the discount factors which sustain the Nash bargaining solution
are given. In Section 3 the closed form solutions are compared with the approximations
made in Alesina [1987]. For this comparison the same casea are analyzed as in Alesina
[1987]. Section 4 contains a short conclusion.
2 The model
Consicler an infinite horizon model with a countable number of periods, denoted by t-
0, I,.... 'I'hcrc are threc players in the modcl, two political parties, denoted by U and R,
and a wage-setting institution. In period t polls are taken which reveal that party D will
win thc clections in period t f 1 with probability P, where 0 C P G 1, and that party R will
wirr the elections with probability 1- P. For simplicity P is assumed to be independent of
t. Immediately after the polls wages for period t t 1 are set by the wage-aetting institution.
A[ter the elections in period t.} 1, the elected party chooses the level of inflation in period
t t l. Then the polls of period t-F 1 take place, and so on. Let HD (HR) denote the level
of in(lation party D(party R) chooses if it would be elected in petiod t and let Hc denote
the Icvcl of in(lation in period t.
IL is assumed that the wage-setting institution attempts to set the proportional increase
in the wage rate for period t, wc, equal to the expected inflation level in that period, given
all information available in period t - 1. This guarantees that the expected level of real
wage~s is kept constant. With q, 0 c q c 1, denoting some given discount rate the cost of2
the wage-setting institution is given by
~ q` ~w~ - PIIo - (1 - P)IIR~ ~ .
i-o
It is assurned that, compared to party R, for party D unemployment is an important issue,
while for this party it is less important to fight againat inflation. A positive relationship
between the rate of output growth and the amount of inflation not expected by the wage
setting institution is derived using either the Lucas supply function or the Phillips curve.
'I'he political parties face the [ollowing costs,
Co - Eioo9` zné - b(IIi - wt) - cIIi~ , for party D,
CR - Eéoo9` s ni~~ for party R,
where b and c are given parameters satisfying 6~ 0 and c 1 0. It will be assumed that
b~-c ~ 0 because otherwise parties D and R have the same objective function, which would
make the analysis trivial. If b is high then political party D considers unemployment to be
very important. If c is high then the level of inflation desired by political party D is high.
First the one-shot game is analyzed. Trivially, in the one-ahot Nash equilibrium for the
game described above the level of inflation and the wage rate are equal to
IIio- 6 f c, dt E N,
II;R- 0, `dt E N,
w~ - P(6 -~- c) , tJt E N,
respectively. The one-shot Nash equilibrium is not on the efTicient frontier of the game.
As is shown in Alesina [I987] the efl' icient írontier of the game can be found by solving in
each period t, t E N,
ii,~~iïk
{I' (2 ~Il,~~l - b ~11~ - w,~ - cll~) f (1 - P) (2 ~IIx~! - b ~I1H - w~~ - cll;t) ~
' t1 (P2 ~IIo~~ ~ ( 1 - P) 2 ~nR~~l J '
where tl ~ 0 corresponds with the weight given to the coat of party R. The part of the
efficicnt frontier which Pareto dominates the one-shot Nash equilibrium corresponds with
II~ - IIH - wi - 1}e, `dt E N, where, in order to guarantee individual rationality,
there might exist a lower bound, Q(P) , and an upper bound, B(P) , on B which both
depend on P. These bounds can be computed easily. Different values of B cortespond with
different points of the efficient frontier. Now the choice of a point on the efficient frontier
is considered to be the outcome of a bargaining procesa between the two partiea. The
outcome of the bargaining process corresponds with some value of B. The Nash bargaining3
~olul,iun iti chusen as solul.ion concept (ser. Na.gh [1953]). The disagreement point is given
by the individual most-pre[erred policies, which correspond to IIU - c and IIR - 0. It
should be remarked that the choice of the disagreement point is rather ambíguoua (see for
example Binmore, Rubinatein, and Wolinsky [1986]). In the appendix of Alesina [1987] it
is derived that the Nash bargaining solution of this game, 9', satiafiea
P - (1 -F B~)3. (1)
Alesina ciid not find a closed form solution for B' as a function of P. As he atatea it:
"In order to quantify these considerations, one would need a closed form for the Nash
bargaining solution (6') . Lacking this, an approximation can be considered as an example:
B' (P) ~ I PP." (2)
The approximation clearly does not satisfy equation (1). In order to find a closed form
expression for the Nash bargaining solution one has to find the inverae of equation (1). In
the appendix it is shown that it ia possible to find this inverse using a method described
in [Jspensky [1948] to solve a cubic equation. The closed form for the Nash bargaining
solut.ion is givcn by
arccos (-~
9'(P) - ~cos ~ 3 l - 1. (3)
In the next section a comparison is made between the closed form for the Nash bargaining
solution and the approximation given in equation (2).
Next the repeated game is considered. In order to investigate the possibilities for coop-
c~ration, t.bc approach of l~ricdman [1971] is followed in Alesina [1987]. Let some indivídual
rational point on the ef[icient frontier be given. Let this point correspond with both parties
playing II' in all periods. In order to sustain this point as a non-cooperative equilibrium
both players use the following strategies. In the first period play II'. In subsequent periods
play II' as long as both patties have always played II' in the past and play the one-shot
Nash equilibrium in all other cases. [t ahould be noticed that harshet punishment strate-
gics rnighL exist (sce Abrcu [1988]). In Alesina [1987] it ia proved that in order to sustain
a point on the efficient frontier corresponding with some given individually rational B as
a subgame perfect equilibrium, using the strategies described above, the diacount factor q
has to satisfy simultaneously the following constraints,
`1-IO1~-1}cB(1
-q)-1tBt(b~-c)'(1-4-Pq)f2Pqc(ófc)G0, (4)
r c l ~
`1 f OI - Pq (b }`)~
~ 0. (5)
3B'fl4
The constraint (4) guarantees that party D has no incentive to deviate from B, while
constraint (5) assures that party R plays cooperatively. If one is interested in the level of
the discount factor needed to sustain the Nash bargaining solution, one has to substitute
the result of equation (3) into equations (4) and (5). Define the function g:(0,1) ~ R by
rarccos ~-~ 1
9(P) - 9'(P) f 1-~ cos I` 3 J, t1P E (0,1).
Then one obtains the following constraints both having to be satiafied:
(c - (b f c) 9 (P))~






It should be noticed that the approximation in equation (2) corresponds with g(P) ~ P.
Ií the constraint in equation (6) (equation (7)) is satisfied then party D(party R) has no
incentive to deviate. In the next section the consequences of using the approximation are
discussed.
3 A comparison of the exact solution with the ap-
proximation
Suppose that the probability that party D wins the elections, P, is given. Then B'(P)
will denote the Nash bargaining solution and B'(P) the approximation of equation (2).
The minimum value of q which satisfies both (4) and (5) when B'(P) is substituted will
be denoted by q'(P), and q'(P) will denote the minimum value of q which is obtained if
0'(P) is substituted. In Figure I a comparison is made between B'(P) and B'(P). The
closed form solution is given by the solid line and the approximation by the broken line.
If 0 G P G z then B'(P) ~ B'(P). This means that if party D has a amall probability
of winning the elections the weight given to party R in the Nash bargaining aolution is
overestimated by the approximation. On the other hand if ~ G P G 1 then B'(P) G B'(P)
which means that if party D has a large probability of winning the elections then the weight
given to party R is underestimated by the approximation. So B'(P) ie always closer to 1
than U'(P) and therefore the difference between the weighta given to the costs of party D
and party R is smaller in the exact Nash bargaining solution than in the approximation.
The approximation is bad if P is small. It is easily shown that it is of the wrong order if
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In Figure II a picture is drawn in order to be able to compare the effect of the approx-
imation on the discount factors for which the Nash bargaining solution is sustainable and
corresponds with Figure II in Alesina [1987~. The constraints the discount factors have
to satisfy are drawn. The constraints induced by the closed form expression are given by
the solid lines and the constraints induced by the approximation are given by the broken
lines. The values of q which sustain the cooperative solution are the ones in the area above
the solid lines. The case where b- 0 and c is an arbitrary positive number is considered
first. In this case the only difference between the political parties is a different desired
level of inflation. The decreasing lines correspond with consttaint (6) and the increasing
lines correspond with constraint (7). Clearly the differences between the solid lines and the
broken lines are considerable. If P j 0 then q'(P) -~ 0, so according to the approximation
party R has no incentive to deviate. However
lP,o 4'(P) - lP1ó I - I o - 3. (8)
P (9 (P))~
- 4 ~~s ~~` `z -
So q~ 3 guarantees that party R will not deviate in case P)Jis close to 0, while the
approximation suggested that q ) 0 is sufficient. The case where P j 1 ia predicted
correctly by t}re approximation with respect to party R. If P j 1 the values of q for which
party D deviates are considerably different from the ones suggested by the approximation.6
--- Approximatíon, b - 0
- Closed form solution, 6- 0
Figure II
According to the approximation q ~ 0 guarantees that party D doea not deviate in case P
is close to 1, while this is only true if q 1 3. This can be shown using symmetry arguments
and equation (8). Only if P- s the approximation gives the correct value of q'(P). This
is the case because if P- z the approximation gives the correct value of B corresponding
with thc IYash bargaining solution, namely B'(~) - B'(z) - 1. The area of values ofq which
sustain the cooperative solution, i.e. the area above the solid lines, is considerably larger
than the area suggested by the approximation, i.e. the area above the broken lines. This
rncans thaL the approximation underestimates (for every value of P) the possibilities of
cooperation between the parties. The result that cooperation is easieat auatained if P-~
remains true however.
In Figure III another picture is drawn in order to be able to compare the effect of
thc approxirnation on thc discoimL factors for which the Nash bargaining solution is sus-
tainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium. This figure correaponds with Figure III in
Alesina (1987]. t Again, the constraints the diacount factors have to satisfy are drawn.
Again, the constraints induced by the closed form expresaion are given by the solid lines
' Figure 111 in Aleeina [1987] ie not drawn correctly. Ftom equation (6) it followa immediately that if
g(P) - P, the case which corresponda with the approximation, and if b~ 0 and P j 1, then according
to the approximation q~ i guatanteea that patty D doee not deviate, while according to Figute III in
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Figure III
and the constraints induced by the approximation are given by the broken lines. The case
considered here is 6- 1 and c- 5. The areas correaponding with the exact solution and
the approximate solution are considerably different. In the case where 6- 0 the approx-
irnation underestimates the possibilities of cooperation. In the case considered in Figure
1[1 the possibilities of cooperation are underestimated by the approximation if 0 G P c z,
overestimated for P between z and approximately 0.88, and are again underestimated for
P between approximately 0.88 and l. Interestingly, the minimum value of q which guar-
antees that party D does not deviate is no longer decreasing as a function of P. There is
a local minimum of this function at about 0.83. Theae minimum values for party D are
givcn by cquation (6). 'Che fact that for party D the minimum value of q is not necessarily
decreasing as a function of P ia not very surprising. If P inereasea then B'(P) decreases,
which means that if the probability that party D wina the electiona increases, it will obtain
a better point on the efíicient frontier. Thia makes patty D less willing to deviate. How-
ever, on the other hand if P increases party D is more likely to win the elections which
is favourable to the pay-offs of party D in the one-shot Nash solution in case c 1 b. This
makes party D more willing to deviate. Hence it is not clear what the effects are of an
increase of P on the minimum value of q which makes D to cooperate. It will be ahown
Lhal. Lh~~ niinirnnm value of q whi~~h makes party IZ to cooperate is increasing as a function8
of P, irrespective the values of 6 and c. According to (7) it must hold that
q, (bfc)~~ (P))~P - 4(btc)~~cos(~~~1~, ` ` 3 J
which is easily seen to be increasing in P.
Finally it should be remarked that in both Figures II and III with respect to party
D, the minimum value of q is overestimated by the approximation for 0 G P G z and
the minimum value of q is underestimated for z G P G 1. With respect to pazty R the
opposite holds. It will be ahown that this is the case for all valuea of 6 and c satiafying
6~ 0, c~ 0, and b~c ~ 0. Using that the approximation overestimates B'(P) if 0 G P G z
and underestimates B'(P) if s G P G 1, the resulta follow if it can be shown that the
expression in the right-hand side of (6),
(c - (b -}~ c) g)~
~(6 -F c)' t P(~ - c~)~ (9)~ - 26cg,
is incrcaving in g for g~ 1 and the expression in the right-hand side of (7),
~
(b f c)' (9)' P'
is decreasing in g for g~ 1. The latter is immediate. In order to show the former it has to
be shown that the function f defined by
! (x) - (a - ~x)~
where





is increasing in x for x ~ 1. Since
f~(f)




the sign of f' (x) is equal to the sign of
2~ ~yx~ - Dx) ~ (a - ~x) (2ryx - ë) - 2aryx - ~óx - aó. (9)9
Substituting x- 1 in (9), one obtaina
2ary -,Bb - aá - 2c (b f c)' f 2cP ~b' - c'~ -(6 f c) 26c - c2óc
- 2c3 ~2cP~b'-c'~ ~0. (10)
Now the result followa using (9) and (10) since for x~ 1
4 Conclusion
'Phis note shows that it is poasible to obtain a closed form expresaion for the Nash bargaining
solution in the model of Alesina [1987]. Moreover, this aolution is derived uaing elementary
mathematical techniques. A comparison is made between the exact reaults and the resulta
obtained in Alesina [1987] which are obtained by using an approximation for the closed
form sulution. Although most of his conclusions are qualitatively correct, quantitatively
there may be conaiderable differences.
Appendix
Sincc it is a.9surncd that P) 0 it is possible, to rewrite equation (1) and obtain
0i3f3B''~(3- p)B'fl- p-0. (11)
So to obtain the solution B' as a function` of P one has to find the zero points of the function
f: Rt -~ R defined by
2ayx - ~áx - ~á ~ 2~ry - pb - ob ~ 0.
t(n)-o~t3o' f (3- ~~)Otl - ~~, dBE Rt.
Substitution of
(12)
in equation (11) yielda
x3 - px.} p- 0.





Since one degree of freedom is left with respect to the choice of y and z it ie poasible to
choosc y and z in such a way that
[Jsing equation (14) gives









y'z' - 1 P3.
Substitut.ing equation (16) in equation (17) yields that y3 has to be a solution of the
equation
8 2 3 I y fPy fp3-~,




Z--p-i p3- p~, (19)
where it should be remembered that 0 G P G 1. Using equation (16) and symmetry
considerations it can be assumed that Y- y3 en Z- z3. Notice that by the theory of
polynomials, there are three solutions for y satisfying y3 - Y. Let ~ be one of these
solutions. Equivalently there are three solutions for z satiafying z3 - Z. Let ' Z be the









Sinc:c y and z have to satisfy equation (15), not all combinations of y and z are allowed.




I:yuations (18) and (19) show thaL for P between 0 and 1, Y and Z arc complex numbera,
which implies that ' Y and ' Z are complex numbers. An arbitrary complex number
n-} (ii, where n and ~3 are reala, can be rewritten as r(cosep ~ íainep) where r- a f~
and cuwp -". I~or Y iL holds that
s
~~Y~~s - l-Pl } `P3 - P~I - P~Ip~
So
where
Y - P~ (coarp f iainrp)
1
~p - arccos (P~P. P) - arccos ~-~ . (20)
Using the formula of De Moivre a posaible solution for ' Y is given by
' Y-~~cos3 f iain3~.
' Z - ~ ~cos3 - iain3~ .
1 1 ` 2 2
tli--2 ~i2f -cos3a-~iain3x.
Conticqucntly Lhe solutions of equation ( 13) are given by
a, - 'Y-~'Z




- ~C09~7r ~ í81n37r1 ~C083 ~ taln3) ~ ~ (C0337r {- i91n37rJ' ~C083 - faln3) -í-
- `~C09 ~3x ~ 31 , ` VVYY ` VY
y9 - TG''Y`frG'ZJ
- ~C09~1r ~ t91n31rJ' ~C083 -} talII3) T ~ } (C0937r ~- tain37r) ~C083 - taÍn3~ T
- `-~COS (3]r ~ 3`
.` Vr ` Vr
For P between 0 and 1 the three aolutions are real numbers. Substitution of equation (20)
and equation (12) yields the solutions of equation (11),
9~ - ~8 arccoa - P 1
t - ~ 3 -
B~ - ~8 ~ } arCCOa - P 1
~ - ~p 3 3 -
0~ - Z~a ~~ } arCC.Oa - P 1
3 - -~ 3 3 -
'1'hen
Moreover it holds that12
If 0 G P G 1 then 4i ~ 0, Bz G-3, and -3 G B3 G 0. Since B' has to be poaitive, the
closed form for the Nash bargaining aolution is given by
(arccos ~-~1
B'(P) - ~cos I 3 J
- 1.
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